One of the more striking aspects of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception (1945) is his use of psychological case studies in pathology. For Merleau-Ponty, a philosophical interpretation of phenomena like aphasia and psychic blindness promises to shed light not just on the nature of pathology, but on the nature of human existence more generally. In this paper, I show that although Merleau-Ponty is surely a pioneer in this use of pathology, his work is deeply indebted to an earlier philosophical study of pathology offered by the German Neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer in the third volume of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1929). More specifically, I argue that Merleau-Ponty, in fact, follows Cassirer in placing Kant's notion of the productive imagination at the centre of his account of pathology and the features of existence it illuminates. Recognizing the debt MerleauPonty's account of pathology has to the Kantian tradition not only acts as a corrective to more recent interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's views of pathology (Dreyfus, Romdenh-Romluc), but also recommends we resist the prevailing tendency to treat Merleau-Ponty's philosophy as anti-Kantian. 
§1. Introduction
One of the more striking aspects of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception (1945) is his use of psychological case studies in pathology. 1 For Merleau-Ponty, a philosophical interpretation of phenomena like aphasia and psychic blindness promises to shed light not just on the nature of pathology, but on the nature of human existence more generally. 2 Yet although Merleau-Ponty is surely a pioneer in this use of pathology, in this paper I show his work is deeply indebted to an earlier philosophical study of pathology offered by the German Neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer in the third volume of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1929). 3 More specifically, I argue that MerleauPonty, in fact, follows Cassirer in placing Kant's notion of the productive imagination at the center of his account of pathology and the features of existence it illuminates.
Recognizing Merleau-Ponty's debt to Cassirer and the Kantian tradition in this regard is crucial for two reasons. In the first place, it recommends we revise the prevailing way of In the early decades of the 20 th century, more and more attention was paid in psychology to problems in pathology. Psychologists, such as Head, Gelb, and Goldstein, conducted extensive research and published case studies on patients suffering from three interrelated types of disorders:
aphasia, agnosia, and apraxia. 8 Whereas aphasia relates to disorders affecting speech, e.g., being unable to name the color of a swatch placed before you ('color amnesia'), agnosia relates to disorders affecting one's capacities for recognition, e.g., psychic blindness, and for thought, e.g., being unable to perform basic arithmetic or understand analogies and metaphors. Meanwhile apraxia relates to disorders affecting one's capacity for action and movement: while a patient may be able to perform a 'concrete action' in response to an actual task, e.g., sewing a wallet at work, she may be unable to perform an 'abstract action' in response to a merely imagined or possible scenario, e.g., mimicking the act of sewing a wallet in a psychologist's office.
In the 1920s, Cassirer became familiar with this research and came to regard it as a source of philosophical insight. 9 This culminates in a lengthy chapter in the third volume of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms titled, 'Toward a Pathology of the Symbolic Consciousness'. As the title of the chapter suggests, Cassirer thinks pathology can teach us something about 'symbolic consciousness'
and, in particular, he thinks it reveals something about what he calls the 'function of representation'
[Darstellungsfunktion].
The representation function
For our purposes, one of the most salient features of Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms is his claim that our consciousness is structured in such a way that we cannot have perceptual experiences that are devoid of meaning. 10 Targeting sense-data views, Cassirer takes issue with the claim that perception involves meaningless sense data we, then, interpret or mentally process: "We can never completely separate the sensory as such, as some naked "raw material" of sensation, from the whole complex of meaning relationships" ('Problem of the Symbol' 416). 11 Though Cassirer allows for the possibility that after the fact we can distinguish matter and meaning (form) in reflection, in experience, he claims, they form an "indivisible unity" ('Problem' 416).
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In order to explain what in our consciousness provides for such pervasive meaningful perception, Cassirer introduces the notion of a 'symbolic function'. He characterizes a symbolic function as a structure of consciousness that allows us to experience the world in 'symbolic' form: it allows us to perceive the objects present to us as symbols of some meaning. In between the expressive and signification functions lies the representation function.
According to Cassirer, the representation function allows us to understand what is present to us here and now as a sign of a meaning that is not only not-present, but also could be encountered in another situation:
[with the representation function] the content first gains the imprint of a new universal form without losing its material 'particularity'… it has become a sign which enables us to recognize [wiederzuerkennen] it again when it appears… for only then does it become possible to find again in the simple, as it were, punctual "here" and "now" of present experience a "nothere" and a "not-now" (PSFv3 114/133).
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For example, through the representation function, I am able to see this apple as a 'sign' of the concept 'red', where this concept is neither wholly located in, nor exhausted by this apple.
Otherwise put, for Cassirer, the representation function is what allows us to see objects as bearers of properties.
According to Cassirer, however, the representation function does not make just one meaning available to us; it saturates the object we experience with several possible meanings, meanings we could take the object to signify if we varied our point of view. For example, though I may be focused right now on the redness of the apple, I could vary my point of view and take the apple to signify the concept 'apple', 'round', or 'Fuji'. As Cassirer makes this point, when we are guided by the representation function, the objects we experience are surrounded by a 'Prägnanz' also has etymological roots in the Latin 'praegnans', which carries both the connotation of 'expecting a child' and 'being full'. As we see in the following definition, Cassirer's use of 'Prägnanz'
relates both to how we perceptually organize the world and find it full of meaning: 15 By symbolic pregnance we mean the way in which a perception as a sensory experience contains at the same time a certain nonintuitive meaning ["Sinn"] which it immediately and concretely represents… It is this ideal interwovenness, this relatedness of the single perceptive phenomenon, given here and now, to a characteristic total meaning [Sinn-Ganzes] that the term "pregnance" is meant to designate (PSFv3 202/234). 16 What Cassirer has in mind, then, is the way in which an object's 'total meaning' is present through its perceptual organization:
it is the perception itself which by virtue of its own immanent organization, takes on a kind of spiritual articulation-which, being ordered in itself, also belongs to a determinate order of meaning [Sinnfügung] (PSFv3 202/234).
When we perceive an object in this way, Cassirer suggests we perceive it as a 'meaningful whole'
[Sinnganzen] in which "every particular aspect is always related to a comprehensive context Though this analysis of the non-discursive nature of the representation function and pregnant perception may at first seem un-Kantian, Cassirer, in fact, takes himself to be making a very Kantian claim. In particular, Cassirer takes himself to be developing Kant's theory of the 'productive imagination', which it will be useful to briefly sketch 17 In the first Critique, Kant offers the following generic definition of the imagination: "Imagination is the faculty for representing an object even without its presence in intuition" (B151). 18 Oftentimes, this faculty will be exercised in a 'reproductive' way, e.g., when we form a representation of an object we have previously intuited; however, Kant argues that our imaginations are also capable of a productive exercise, in which we spontaneously produce representations without the object being present (see B152). The transcendental activities of the productive imagination, in turn, play an important role in Kant's analysis of experience, for he argues that experience is possible only if the productive imagination mediates between two other cognitive capacities: sensibility, i.e., our capacity for being affected by the world, and understanding, i.e., our capacity for thinking about the world (see A124). 19 This, in turn, shapes our perceptual experience; hence Kant's claim that, "the imagination is a necessary ingredient in perception itself" (A120fn ).
Cassirer interprets Kant's claims about the productive imagination as follows:
[the productive imagination as] "ingredient of perception" in the strict sense can never be a factor which is simply added to the given sensation… to reinterpret it by judgment… Here we have no such subsequent completion but an act of original formation Here, Cassirer emphasizes that, for Kant, the productive imagination is a capacity that, without recourse to discursive thought, enables us to immediately perceive objects as meaningful wholes. 20 And it is this idea that Cassirer seeks to develop in his own account of the representation function and pregnant perception.
However, Cassirer has another reason to align the representation function with the productive imagination, viz., the tight connection he sees between our productive imagination and ability to 'see' possibilities. As we saw above, for Kant, the imagination is our capacity 'for representing an object even without its presence in intuition'. This means that the imagination is not as directly confined to what is given here and now as is sensibility. Of course, the reproductive imagination only has a limited distance from sensibility; however, the productive imagination has more freedom in this regard, as it is able to spontaneously produce representations. This is another theme Cassirer picks up on, as he interprets the productive imagination as the "ability to interchange present and nonpresent, the real and the possible" (PSFv3 271/315). Once again, Cassirer takes this to be the capacity that underwrites pregnant perception, for in this type of perception we are never stuck in just one way of looking at an object; rather, we can engage in 'free play' and vary our point of view so different meanings emerge (PSFv3 271/315). 21 Indeed, it is through this free play of our imagination we are attuned to the vector of meaning that informs the object of pregnant perception.
The representation function and pathology
As noted previously, on Cassirer's view, the representation function is what malfunctions in pathological experience. Cassirer argues that in pathology a patient's productive imagination is compromised, her capacity for pregnant perception diminishes, and the vectors of meaning 'disintegrate' (PSFv3 222/257). Cassirer is clear that this does not amount to a total loss of these capacities or the destruction of all vectors of meaning, "for that would mean the extinction of sensory consciousness itself"; rather his claim is that in pathology, the patient's perception is more restricted, it "moves within narrower limits, in smaller and more restricted circles than in the case of normal perception" (PSFv3 222/257).
More specifically, Cassirer claims that pathological patients become oriented primarily towards meanings that are connected to what is "immediately perceived and desired" (PSFv3 277/322). To make this point, Cassirer compares the behavior of a pathological patient to the "merely purposive behaviour within the biological sphere" (PSFv3 276/321). 22 He claims that This diminishing of pregnant perception and the vectors of meaning manifests itself variously in the different pathologies Cassirer considers. In his discussion of aphasia, Cassirer argues that a patient's inability to name items stems from his inability to engage in pregnant perception. In color amnesia, for example, Cassirer suggests that the patient is unable to name a colored swatch because he no longer sees this swatch as a sign of the relevant color-species. Instead, the patient is focused exclusively on the immediate features of the swatch, e.g., its particular brightness and tone (PSFv3 225-7/261-3).
Meanwhile in perceptual agnosia, e.g., psychic blindness, Cassirer argues that patients can no longer engage in a more basic form of pregnant perception: the patient cannot even perceive aspects of an object as 'signs' of a particular object. For example, the patient cannot immediately grasp spatial features as features of an object (PSFv3 239-240/278). Instead, Cassirer claims, he can identify an object only by resorting to discursive thought (PSFv3 239-240/279). Describing his own encounter with an agnosiac, Cassirer notes that, at first, the patient sees only 'a long black line with something wide on top' and that 'the thing on top is transparent and has four bars', and then draws the inference that the object is, therefore, a lamppost (PSFv3 241fn/279fn).
However, for Cassirer, the inability to 'see' in terms of possibilities does not just beset our perceptions; it undermines our ability to think as well, hence results in cognitive agnosia. In order to perform basic arithmetic, Cassirer suggests we must be able to regard the numbers in different possible ways, e.g., in order to do the equation 7-5=2, we must regard 7 as a 'relative zero' and count five steps backwards (PSFv3 250/291, 255-6/296-8). The patient, however, can only regard the number 7 as the seventh number in the ordinary number sequence, not as a possible 0. Likewise, in metaphorical thinking, we must be able to regard words or phrases as having both a literal and a figurative meaning; but for the patient, language is only literal and applicable to actual situations (PSFv3 254-9/295-300). For example, a patient will be unable to say "It is bad, rainy weather today"
if it is a sunny day (PSFv3 254/295). Cassirer attributes these issues to a problem with the patient's productive imagination: he is anchored in the actual, closed off from the possible:
[the patient] can form a sentence when he has solid support in something given, immediately experienced; without this support he is rudderless-he cannot venture out on the high seas of thought, which is a thought not only of realities but also of possibilities. Hence he can express only what is actual and present, not what is merely imagined or possible (PSFv3 257/298-9).
Finally, we find a variation on this same theme in Cassirer's analysis of apraxia; however, in these cases, it is his own body that the patient is unable to 'see' in terms of possibilities. While a patient is able to engage in 'concrete movements' called for by the actual task he is engaged in, e.g., hammering in a workshop, he cannot engage in 'abstract movements', which are relevant to a nonactual situation, e.g., mimicking hammering. On Cassirer's analysis, this is because the latter movements require the patient to be able to 'see' his body as capable of bearing on a merely possible or imagined situation; yet this is barred from the patient insofar as he is unable to spontaneously bring about those movements by projecting an imaginary scenario before himself (PSFv3 271/315). we cannot apply the classical distinction of form and matter to perception, nor can we conceive the perceiving subject as consciousness which "interprets," "deciphers," or "orders" a sensible matter according to an ideal law which it possesses. Matter is "pregnant"
[prégnante] with form (PrP 12). Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty is sensitive to the fact that rather than emphasizing judgment, Cassirer emphasizes the productive imagination. This is important because, more generally, Kant's notion of the productive imagination stands in Merleau-Ponty's good favor, as something protophenomenological. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty thinks that the phenomenological analysis of intentionality has its roots in Kant's account of the productive imagination (PhP xxxi/17-8). Recall that, for Kant, in order for experience to be possible, the productive imagination must mediate between sensibility and understanding. To this end, Kant rather suggestively claims that our ability to make judgments depends on the imagination's "hidden art [Kunst] in the depths of the human soul" (A141/B180). Merleau-Ponty interprets this claim as follows:
the hidden art of the imagination must condition the categorial activity; it is no longer merely aesthetic judgment that rests upon this hidden art, but also knowledge [connaissance], and this art also grounds the unity of consciousness (PhP xxxi/18).
This idea, however, is one he regards as a precursor to the idea found in Heidegger and the later
Husserl that the intentionality of any particular act, e.g., this judgment, is grounded in a deeper intentionality, 'operative intentionality', that lies beneath and unifies every act (PhP xxxii/18). 26 To be sure, Merleau-Ponty wants to distance 'operative intentionality' from Kant's conception of the productive imagination as a mental capacity; 27 however, he takes the kernel of Kant's account to be worth developing. According to Merleau-Ponty, consciousness is not something that is exclusively intellectual; rather, he argues that, "Consciousness is being toward the thing through the intermediary of the body" (PhP 140/173). Though we can be intentionally directed towards the world through our thoughts, he maintains that we can also be directed towards the world through our bodies; hence, he urges that we must recognize "the body itself as a… "motor intentionality"" (PhP 113/141). 28 Indeed, insofar as we are always directed towards the world through our bodies, he describes motor the 'function of projection', which is at the heart of his analysis of pathology. There are two competing varieties of the motor-centric interpretation presently on offer.
The motor-centric interpretations
First, drawing on Merleau-Ponty's claims that we have a 'pre-reflective' or 'pre-logical' experience of the world, there is the unreflective motor-centric interpretation according to which Merleau-Ponty intends for pathology to clarify how we unreflectively relate to the world through our bodily actions and movements. 29 Commentators like Dreyfus, Sean Kelly, and Taylor Carman 30 have defended this position, maintaining that Merleau-Ponty uses pathology to highlight features of 'absorbed coping', i.e., our bodily way of dealing with the world that occurs without the intervention of thought or reflection. 31 Challenging this line of thought, Romdenh-Romluc has put forth a reflective variety of the motor-centric interpretation, according to which Merleau-Ponty uses pathology to explain an important kind of bodily action, viz., action guided by thought ( (2007), (2011): 93-102). On her account, the textual evidence suggests that Merleau-Ponty uses pathology not just to highlight our unreflective capacities, but also to elucidate a particular reflective capacity, viz., "the power to reckon with the possible"' (PhP 112/139). 32 On her gloss, the power to reckon with the possible is "the power to access-and so use-motor skills that are relevant to merely possible tasks and environments," where 'merely possible' refers to the tasks or environments I represent in thought
( (2007): 52, (2011): 94). 33 Though her account is still oriented towards explaining bodily action, her view is unique insofar as she allows for reflection to play a pivotal role in guiding that action. 34 In what follows, I show that the motor-centric interpretation's exclusive emphasis on what pathology teaches us about bodily action, whether this be guided by thought or not, is misplaced.
To be sure, Merleau-Ponty devotes a great deal of attention to the relationship between pathology and bodily action; however, this constitutes but one aspect of his overall project. As the imagination-centric interpretation reveals, Merleau-Ponty has a more fundamental aim, viz., highlighting something like the productive imagination, which he calls the 'function of projection', which brings unity to the various ways we deal with the world through action, perception, emotion, thought, etc.
The function of projection
Throughout the Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty argues that it is a mistake to think of the human subject as somehow isolated from the external world; rather, drawing on Heidegger, he claims each of us is an embodied 'being-in-the-world', i.e., we are essentially bound up with the world around us Merleau-Ponty defines the function of projection as,
[the] power of marking out borders and directions in the given world, of establishing lines of force, of arranging perspectives, of organizing the given world according to the projects of the moment, and of constructing upon the geographical surroundings a milieu of behavior and a system of significations that express, on the outside, the internal activity of the subject… the normal person's projects polarize the world (PhP 115/143).
As he makes this point later, "for the normal person, the subject's intentions are immediately reflected in the perceptual field: they polarize it, put their stamp on it, or finally, effortlessly give birth there to a wave of significations" (PhP 133/164-5). Now, this characterization of projection has seemed worrisome to some insofar as it appears to appeal to a view of the subject that MerleauPonty rejects; 36 however, as we see in the following passage, Merleau-Ponty does not think that there is a de facto tension between the idea that the subject is inseparable from the world and that she projects it:
The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject who is nothing but a project of the world; and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world that it itself projects. The subject is being-in-the-world and the world remains 'subjective' (PhP 454/493). 37 Far from distancing himself from the notion of projection, Merleau-Ponty, in fact, puts it at the core of subjectivity. In which case, his account of the function of projection plays a crucial role in elucidating the type of subjects we are.
In order to clarify what sorts of intentions are at stake in projection, Merleau-Ponty introduces the notion of the 'intentional arc' (PhP 137/169-170, 160/194). 38 He describes the intentional arc as follows:
the life of consciousness-epistemic life, the life of desire, or perceptual life-is underpinned by an "intentional arc" that projects around us our past, our future, our human milieu, our physical situation, our ideological situation, and our moral situation, or rather, that ensures that we are situated within all of these relationships (PhP 137/169-170). 39 This passage reveals that Merleau-Ponty is not concerned with how we project the world solely in light of one type of intention, e.g., those related to bodily movement; he is interested in how we project the world in light of rich variety of intentions. Likewise, Merleau-Ponty does not privilege intentions that are explicit or reflective; there can also be implicit intentions that we project the world in light of that fall on this arc. The intentional arc, then, involves a spectrum of intentions, which are all underwritten by the same 'core function', i.e., the function of projection. 40 It is in this regard that the function of projection with its intentional arc begins to betray its Kantian roots. 41 Recall that, for Kant, the productive imagination is responsible for mediating between two seemingly distinct capacities: sensibility and understanding. As we saw above, on
Merleau-Ponty's interpretation, this means that the imagination 'grounds the unity of consciousness', i.e., it unifies how we relate to the world in these different ways (PhP xxxi/18). 42 Merleau-Ponty, however, treats the intentional arc in a similar way, claiming that it "creates the unity of the senses, the unity of the senses with intelligence, and the unity of sensitivity and motricity" (PhP 137/169-170). Like Kant before him, then, he takes there to be a special function (of imagination, of projection) that grounds the divergent ways we have of relating to the world and gives unity to the different facets of our existence.
However take us to be reckoning with the possible not just when we engage in practical activities, but when we take up any intention on the arc, whether it be more practically oriented or not.
The function of projection and pathology
Turning now to Merleau-Ponty's account of pathology, we find that he, like Cassirer before him, However, though Merleau-Ponty is concerned, in part, with explaining how each particular disorder manifests the same problem, it is crucial to recognize that the center-piece of his analysis is his explanation of why pathology manifests holistically, i.e., why linguistic, perceptual, motor, and cognitive disorders go hand in hand. According to Merleau-Ponty, when a patient's intentional arc 'goes limp', this reverberates across her experience as she is 'confined to the actual' in everything she does, perceives, thinks, and feels.
Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the holistic effect of pathology most in his discussion of one of Gelb and Goldstein's patients, 'Schneider', who suffered a brain injury from a shell splinter. One of the results of Schneider's injury is his inability to both initiate sexual contact, and, if he stumbles into such a situation, bring the act to completion. Merleau-Ponty analyzes this situation as follows,
The patient has lost the power of projecting before himself a sexual world, of putting himself into an erotic situation, or, once the situation is under way, of sustaining it or of following it through to satisfaction… the tactile stimuli themselves… have, so to speak, ceased speaking to his body… because the patient has ceased posing to his surrounding that silent and permanent question that defines normal sexuality (PhP 159/193-4).
However, Merleau-Ponty goes on to point out that Schneider's sexual problems are accompanied by a wide-range of other problems: he can no longer place himself, within an affective or ideological situation… Faces are neither pleasant nor unpleasant… The sun and the rain are neither joyful nor sad… the world is affectively neutral… He would like to be able to think about politics or religion, but he never even tries (PhP 159-160/194).
According to Merleau-Ponty, Schneider suffers from this suite of problems because the intentional arc of his life has given way: the multiple possible intentions normally available have become leveled down. This leads Merleau-Ponty to claim that Schneider's case reveals, the vital roots of perception, motricity, and representation, by grounding all of these "processes" upon an "intentional arc" that weakens for the patient and that for the normal subject gives experience its degree of vitality and fecundity (PhP 160/195).
This, then, is the lesson Merleau-Ponty draws from pathology: it elucidates not one facet of our lives, but the unity of our lives as a whole.
Merleau-Ponty's advance of the productive imagination
So far, I have emphasized that rather than being motor-centric, Merleau-Ponty's account of pathology, like Cassirer's before him, is imagination-centric. This interpretation makes better sense of not only Merleau-Ponty's claim that pathology is traceable back to the function of projection and intentional arc, but also his emphasis on the holistic effect of pathology. However, even if the imagination-centric interpretation is right and points towards the Kantian roots of Merleau-Ponty's account of pathology, Merleau-Ponty does not simply appropriate the productive imagination as it is presented in Kant or in Cassirer; for, unlike his predecessors, he explicitly takes up the embodied nature of the productive imagination.
Regardless of whether Kant or Cassirer ultimately thought the productive imagination has an important relationship to us as embodied human beings, this is not a feature of their account either chooses to emphasize. 43 By contrast, Merleau-Ponty highlights the bodily nature of the productive imagination in the three following ways. To begin, Merleau-Ponty maintains that our productive imagination can be exercised through our bodies without the involvement of the intellect. For example, Merleau-Ponty suggests that even if I have not reflectively formed an intention to pick something up, if I reach towards it with my hand, this movement will involve the intentionality of my body (PhP 140/172). In which case, rather than characterizing the productive imagination as a mental capacity, he treats it as one that can manifest through the body alone. 44 Second, insofar as Merleau-Ponty defines consciousness as being towards the world through our bodies, then any conscious act will somehow involve motor intentionality. This is not to say that every conscious act will involve an intention to move my body in a particular way; rather, his idea is that whether we are engaged in bodily movement, reflective thought, or some other conscious activity, we are directed towards the world through our bodies. 45 This, in turn, means that for Merleau-Ponty the intellectual exercise of our productive imaginations depends on our embodiment and what he calls motor intentionality. Third, however, Merleau-Ponty also acknowledges that there is a reciprocal relationship between our bodily dealings with the world and our more reflective engagement with it:
there is no single movement in a living body that is an absolute accident with regard to psychical intentions and no single psychical act that has not found at least its germ or its general outline in physiological dispositions (PhP 90/117-8).
There thus appears to be a dynamic relation between the different ways we have of projecting, whether they be more or less oriented towards our embodied or cognitive existence. 
